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Soft Law as Governing Law 
Steven L. Schwarcz† 
INTRODUCTION 
Commercial, financial, and other international business 
transactions increasingly are conducted1 under “soft law” rules.2 
Some argue “we are witnessing the twilight of the traditional 
regulatory system and its gradual replacement by an amorphous 
and constantly evolving set of informal ‘soft law’ governance 
 
†  Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School 
of Law; Senior Fellow, the Centre for International Governance Innovation 
(CIGI). The author thanks José Enrique Alvarez, Henry Gabriel, Ralf Michaels, 
Alex Mills, Joost Pauwelyn, John A.E. Pottow, Geneviève Saumier, Michael 
Simkovic, Symeon Symeonides, and participants in a faculty workshop at Elon 
University School of Law for excellent comments and Ryan Arredondo and Kris 
Liu for valuable research assistance. Although the author is independently 
leading a CIGI inquiry into using soft law as governing law, the views expressed 
in this Article are entirely his own. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
Copyright © 2020 by Steven L. Schwarcz.  
 1. Cf. infra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining different ways in 
which a transaction could be conducted under soft-law rules). 
 2. See generally GEORGES AFFAKI & SIR ROY GOODE, GUIDE TO ICC UNI-
FORM RULES FOR DEMAND GUARANTEES URDG 758, at vi (2011) (observing that 
the “percentage of guarantees subject to URDG 758 [soft law in the form of the 
ICC’s Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees] is increasing by the day and at a 
very satisfactory rate”); ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN & ELLIOTT POSNER, VOLUNTARY 
DISRUPTIONS: INTERNATIONAL SOFT LAW, FINANCE, AND POWER (2018) (exam-
ining the global economy’s increasing reliance on soft law). The UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, promulgated by a non-binding General Assembly 
resolution in 1948, is a highly influential example of soft law, having influenced 
several later human rights treaties. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).  
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mechanisms.”3 The University of Michigan Law School recently 
held an international conference to explore this phenomenon.4  
Although not well-defined,5 soft law generally refers to non-
state rules that may be aspirational or reflect best practices but 
are not yet legally enforceable.6 For this reason, soft law some-
times is called non-state law.7 It contrasts with standard, or 
“hard,” law, which is legally enforceable.8 The shift to soft law 
responds, at least in part, to the growing difficulty of adopting 
international treaties.9  
 
 3. Ryan Hagemann et al., Soft Law for Hard Problems: The Governance of 
Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 37, 37 
(2018). 
 4. Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Conference, Soft Law in International Insol-
vency and Commercial Law (Sept. 21–22, 2018) [hereinafter Michigan Law Con-
ference]. The author participated in this conference as a Distinguished  
Fellow.  
 5. The author observed profound disagreement at the Michigan Law Con-
ference about what “soft law” precisely means. Id. 
 6. This reflects the author’s perception of the consensus of the conference 
participants. See Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 68, 69 (David Armstrong ed., Routledge 2009), (observing that many vari-
eties of soft law are “non-binding normative instruments [that] emerge from the 
work of international organizations, which in most instances lack the power to 
adopt binding measures”); supra note 5. Common examples of soft law “include 
normative resolutions of international organizations, concluding texts of sum-
mit meetings or international conferences, recommendations of treaty bodies 
overseeing compliance with treaty obligations, bilateral or multilateral memo-
randa of understanding, executive political agreements, and guidelines or codes 
of conduct adopted in a variety of contexts.” Shelton, supra, at 4.  
 7. E.g., Ralf Michaels, Non-State Law in the Hague Principles on Choice 
of Law in International Commercial Contracts, in VARIETIES OF EUROPEAN ECO-
NOMIC LAW AND REGULATION: LIBER AMICORUM FOR HANS MICKLITZ 43, 43–69 
(Kai Purnhagen & Peter Rott eds., 2014) (discussing soft law and non-state law 
interchangeably).  
 8. The terminology can be even more confusing because the term “‘[r]ules 
of law,’ as opposed to ‘law,’ has traditionally been understood to include non-
state law.” Id. at 44. To minimize confusion, this Article will not use that term.  
 9. See infra Part I. Other reasons for the shift to soft law are more subtle. 
See Joost Pauwelyn et al., When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and 
Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 743 (2014) (ar-
guing that other reasons for the shift to soft law include “the emergence of an 
increasingly diverse and complex network/knowledge society [that] is trans-
forming the actors, processes, and outputs at work or required to deliver inter-
national cooperation”); cf. E-mail from Alex Mills, Professor of Pub. & Private 
Int’l Law, Univ. Coll. of London Faculty of Laws, to author (Jan. 8, 2019) (on 
file with author) (observing that soft law sometimes is developed through an 
industry-led bottom-up process in which industry prefers to avoid state control, 
as would occur under a treaty framework). 
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Whatever its cause, the shift is creating uncertainty because 
soft law’s unenforceability undermines predictability.10 To in-
crease predictability, this Article argues for an innovative use of 
soft law: as a set of rules to choose as all or part of the governing 
“law” of business contracts.11 If respected, this use of soft law 
would be transformational: making the soft law enforceable 
against the parties and providing a flexible and practical alter-
native to treaty-making.  
The analysis focuses, first, on whether parties should have 
the contractual right to choose soft law to govern their business 
transactions. Thereafter, the analysis focuses on an alternative: 
incorporating soft law merely by reference into contracts.12 To 
 
 10. See, e.g., Robin Creyke, ‘Soft Law’ and Administrative Law: A New 
Challenge, 61 AIAL F. 15, 18 (2010) (arguing that including unenforceable soft-
law rules together with enforceable mandatory requirements in “one document 
with little distinction made between compliance obligations” can “lead to confu-
sion and higher costs, and ultimately to litigation to resolve these uncertain-
ties”); see also José E. Alvarez, Reviewing the Use of “Soft Law” in Investment 
Arbitration, 7.2 EUR. INT’L ARB. REV. 149, 149 (2018) (“Everything about ‘soft 
law’ is controversial.”).  
 11. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, PRINCIPLES ON 
CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS cmt. ¶ 1.18 (2015) 
[hereinafter HAGUE PRINCIPLES], https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/ 
conventions/full-text/?cid=135 [https://perma.cc/4PL3-VA8P] (observing that al-
lowing parties to use soft law as governing law would be “novel”); Lauro Gama, 
Jr. & Geneviève Saumier, Non-State Law in the (Proposed) Hague Principles on 
Choice of Law in International Contracts, in EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 
PRIVADO EN LOS PROCESOS DE INTEGRACIÓN REGIONAL 41, 50 (Diego P. Fernán-
dez Arroyo & Juan José Obando Peralta eds., 2011) (observing that allowing the 
designation of non-state law outside of arbitration contracts “would be innova-
tive for virtually all legal systems”). Professor Michaels calls this a “revolution 
in choice of law for contracts” and a “novelty” for state courts. Michaels, supra 
note 7, at 43. 
 12. Business transactions could be conducted under soft-law rules in at 
least two other ways: in the “shadow” of soft-law rules, or with the soft law 
forming the basis of enactment of hard law, which governs the transaction. Cf. 
NEWMAN & POSNER, supra note 2, at 35–37 (offering the Basel Committee’s cap-
ital-adequacy standards, the macroprudential regulatory recommendations of 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and the master agreements of the Interna-
tional Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) as examples of soft law gov-
erning financial and business transactions; whereas these examples more pre-
cisely are of soft-law rules that have been enacted into hard law, in the case of 
Basel and the FSB, and of privately negotiated model forms of contracts, in the 
case of ISDA). Conducting transactions in the shadow of those rules represents 
influence, not law per se. Conducting transactions under hard law based on soft 
law represents a time-honored and uncontroversial function of soft law that in-
cludes all uniform lawmaking in the United States, including, for example, the 
work of the private-sector American Law Institute and National Conference of 
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provide real-world grounding, the Article links its analysis to a 
parallel inquiry by the Centre for International Governance In-
novation (CIGI), an “independent, non-partisan think tank with 
an objective” perspective.13 CIGI hopes to facilitate the restruc-
turing of unsustainable sovereign debt by persuading parties to 
choose its sovereign-debt-restructuring model law (the Model 
Law)14 to include as part of their sovereign-debt contracts’ gov-
erning law.15 The Model Law is a set of soft-law rules, not yet 
enacted into law by any governmental body.16 As an alternative, 
CIGI is considering persuading those parties to merely incorpo-
rate the Model Law by reference into their contracts.17  
Historically, the contractual right to choose soft law as gov-
erning law has been narrowly restricted to arbitration.18 The 
 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL, or Uniform Laws Commis-
sion) in preparing a model text of the Uniform Commercial Code for enactment 
by states. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of 
Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995). 
 13. See About CIGI, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, https://www 
.cigionline.org/about [https://perma.cc/R3EX-PC7H]. 
 14. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION 
POL’Y BRIEF NO. 64, A MODEL-LAW APPROACH TO RESTRUCTURING UNSUSTAIN-
ABLE SOVEREIGN DEBT, app. at 5–7 (2017), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/ 
default/files/documents/PB%20no.64%20Updated_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M4U3-2EVU] (providing the codified text of the Model Law). 
 15. The author thanks Professor Hans Tjio of National University of Sin-
gapore Faculty of Law for originally suggesting this possible approach. Assume, 
for example, that the parties choose the Model Law as part of their sovereign 
debt contract’s governing law, and that their contract is otherwise intended to 
be governed by New York law. The governing law clause might then state that 
the contract “is governed by New York law and the Model Law; in the event of 
a conflict, the Model Law will govern.” See infra note 30 and accompanying text 
(explaining why the right to choose soft law as governing law should include the 
right to choose that soft law as all or part of the governing law). Parties could 
include such a governing law clause in new contracts and, by amendment, also 
in existing contracts. 
 16. CIGI’s ideal goal is to persuade governments to enact the Model Law as 
their national law. See infra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. If and when 
such enactment occurs, the Model Law would be an international model law 
from the perspective of governments so enacting it, and soft law from the per-
spective of other governments. See infra Part I.  
 17. The author, a Senior Fellow of CIGI, is leading these soft-law-as-gov-
erning-law and incorporation-by-reference inquiries. See supra note †. 
 18. Arbitration is the out-of-court resolution of disputes by one or more im-
partial third parties, whose decision the disputing parties agree to accept. 
SYMEON SYMEONIDES, CHOICE OF LAW 408 (2016) (“Although nonstate norms 
long have been used in arbitration, they have not received legislative or judicial 
sanction for use in litigation.”); see also id. at 487–88 (noting that parties may 
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non-arbitration precedents are few.19 The Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC) provides a possible U.S. precedent,20 allowing par-
ties to vary its provisions by “stating that their relationship will 
be governed by recognized bodies of rules or principles applicable 
to commercial transactions.”21 That recognition requirement re-
stricts the choice to soft law promulgated “by intergovernmental 
authorities such as UNCITRAL or Unidroit” or to trade codes 
such as the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits (UCP), a codification of customs and practice governing 
 
choose to have arbitrators apply non-state substantive and/or procedural law 
“drafted by private nongovernmental bodies without any popular participation 
or approbation, and [expressing] the views and predilections of those who draft 
them”); Geneviève Saumier, Designating the UNIDROIT Principles in Interna-
tional Dispute Resolution, 17 UNIF. L. REV. 533, 538 (2012) (“The exception [i.e., 
choosing soft law as the choice of law] is reserved to the arbitral setting, where 
it is now generally accepted that non-State law can govern the parties’ contract 
and provide the substantive rules for the resolution of disputes between the 
parties.”). 
 19. See Gama, Jr. & Saumier, supra note 11, at 50 (recognizing the novelty 
of designating non-state law in contexts other than arbitration contracts). 
 20. The reservation that this is merely a “possible” U.S. precedent reflects 
ambiguity whether the above-quoted text contemplates a choice of soft law or 
merely an incorporation of soft law by reference. Infra note 21 and accompany-
ing text. The argument for the latter is that UCC § 1-301 addresses choice of 
law—or at least, choice of hard law—and thus UCC § 1-302 must address some-
thing else. Cf. E-mail from Geneviève Saumier, Peter M. Laing Q.C. Professor 
of Law, McGill Univ. Faculty of Law, to author (Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with 
author). For several reasons, this Article takes the position that the above-
quoted text contemplates a choice of soft law. First, that text envisions the par-
ties agreeing “that their relationship will be governed by recognized bodies of 
rules or principles,” which is unequivocal choice-of-law language. See, e.g., 
HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, cmt. ¶ 4.3 (observing that a statement that 
a contract is “governed by” a particular law “meet[s] the requirements of an 
express choice” of law). Second, there is no inherent contradiction between UCC 
§ 1-301 addressing choice of hard law and UCC § 1-302 separately addressing 
choice of soft law. Third, the UCC’s only example of parties implementing the 
above-quoted language provides that the relevant body of soft law thereby be-
comes the “law of the transaction.” See U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. (AM. LAW INST. & 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). Finally, New York law provides that “a letter of credit 
that incorporates the UCP is not governed in any respect by” state law. See id. 
§ 5-116 cmt. 3 (referencing New York law related to this topic). That would 
make sense only if the letter of credit incorporates the UCP as governing law, 
not merely by reference; otherwise, the letter of credit would be a contract with 
no governing law (contrat sans loi). See infra Part III.B. 
 21. U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 2 (“Variation by Agreement.”). 
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international letters of credit.22 This precedent gives parties very 
limited freedom to choose soft law as governing law.23  
The only other non-arbitration precedent24 appears, incon-
gruously, to be a provision of Paraguay law that allows parties 
to international contracts to select “generally accepted” soft law 
as governing law.25 That provision, however, follows the Hague 
Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Con-
tracts (Hague Principles),26 a set of soft-law principles promul-
gated by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, an 
intergovernmental organization.27 Although the Hague Princi-
ples do not purport to be legally binding,28 they favor the right of 
parties to choose “rules” of soft law “that are generally accepted 
on an international, supranational or regional level as a neutral 
and balanced set of rules.”29  
 
 22. Id.; see also infra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the UCP). 
The UCP is one of the world’s most generally accepted bodies of commercial soft 
law. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Using Soft Law in International Commercial 
Contract Arbitration, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 58, 84 (Qiao Liu et al. eds., 2016). 
 23. Saumier, supra note 18, at 536.  
 24. The Rome I Regulation, setting EU conflict-of-laws rules, originally pro-
posed allowing contracting parties to choose certain limited, internationally rec-
ognized, soft-law rules as governing law. Commission Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Contrac-
tual Obligations (Rome I), at 14–15, COM (2005) 650 final (Dec. 12, 2005). How-
ever, that proposal was not ultimately adopted. See Regulation (EC) No. 
593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 10–11 
(allowing incorporation by reference under Article 3 and Recital (13)).  
 25. Sobre el Derecho Aplicable a los Contratos Internacionales [Regarding 
the Applicable Law to International Contracts Law] Ley No. 5393, art. 5 (2015) 
(Para.), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/contractslaw_py.pdf. 
 26. See HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11.  
 27. About HCCH, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/about [https://perma 
.cc/2XSL-XREU]. For an excellent introduction to the Hague Principles, see 
Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for Interna-
tional Contracts: Some Preliminary Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873 (2013). 
The Hague Principles are accompanied by a commentary written by a working 
group led by Professor Daniel Girsberger. Id. at 874–75. 
 28. Symeonides, supra note 27, at 874. The Hague Principles “can be seen 
both as an illustration of how a comprehensive choice of law regime for giving 
effect to party autonomy may be constructed and as a guide to ‘best practices’ 
in establishing and refining such a regime.” HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, 
cmt. ¶ 1.5. 
 29. HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, art. 3 at 18. 
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Accordingly, the few non-arbitration precedents for choosing 
soft law as governing law are limited to soft law that either is 
promulgated by a leading intergovernmental authority, gener-
ally accepted (or at least generally accepted as neutral and bal-
anced), or a trade code. The limits to each of these precedents 
implicitly require that the soft law chosen as governing law have 
some degree of legitimacy.  
This Article examines and goes beyond these limited prece-
dents to analyze whether parties should be able to choose soft 
law as governing law30 or, at least, incorporate such soft law by 
reference. The analysis focuses on business contracting, which 
not only is a core concern of private international law31 but also 
addresses rights and obligations among private citizens of differ-
ent countries.32 Part I discusses the rise of soft law and explains 
why soft law is becoming an alternative to adopting interna-
tional treaties. Part II then analyzes whether soft-law choice of 
law should be enforceable. Thereafter, Part III compares incor-
porating soft law by reference into contracts and analyzes 
whether that should be enforceable. Part IV applies the Article’s 
proposed choice-of-law and incorporation-by-reference frame-
works to CIGI’s Model Law, as an example of soft law. Finally, 
Appendix A examines other possible applications of these frame-
works to soft law.  
Throughout, the Article strives to present its analysis based 
on first principles, cutting through much of the opaque choice-of-
law jargon that has amassed over time. That should not only 
 
 30. All references in this Article to choosing soft law as governing law shall 
encompass choosing soft law as all or part of the governing law. Cf. supra text 
accompanying note 11 (stating that this Article argues for using soft law as a 
set of rules to choose as “all or part of the governing ‘law’ of business contracts”). 
If parties have the right to choose soft law as governing law, that right logically 
should extend, as the parties specify, to all or just part of the contract—paral-
leling the right of parties to choose hard law as governing law for all or part of 
their contract. See HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, art. 2 at 18 (providing 
that “parties may choose – (a) the law applicable to the whole contract or to only 
part of it; and (b) different laws for different parts of the contract”).  
 31. Cf. Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts 
Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 571, 594–95 (1999) 
(observing that the modern framework of private international law, which was 
developed by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, was largely centered around conflict-
of-laws rules for international contracts).  
 32. 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1096 (1935). 
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make the Article more accessible but also help to reveal insights 
and connections long obscured by the jargon.33  
I.  THE RISE OF SOFT LAW 
The rise of soft law responds, at least in part, to the increas-
ing difficulty of adopting international treaties.34 A treaty or con-
vention—the terms are synonymous—is a legal agreement or 
compact among nations.35 The politics of a treaty, and the expec-
tation that it needs a widespread consensus, can discourage its 
adoption.36  
For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pro-
posed a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) 
treaty for restructuring troubled sovereign debt.37 Although the 
United States Treasury Secretary initially supported the 
SDRM,38 he later shifted position due to lobbying by Wall 
Street39 and certain emerging market countries,40 thereby assur-
ing the SDRM’s demise. More recently, a majority of the mem-
bers of the United Nations voted to begin work on a “multilateral 
 
 33. See, e.g., infra Part II.B (revealing the relationship between party au-
tonomy and freedom of contracting). 
 34. See Joost Pauwelyn, Rule-Based Trade 2.0? The Rise of Informal Rules 
and International Standards and How They May Outcompete WTO Treaties, 17 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 739, 740–44 (2014) (discussing correlation between the rise in 
soft law and stagnation in the formation of traditional treaty rules). 
 35. See Treaty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
 36. Cf. BRAD SETSER, INITIATIVE FOR POLICY DIALOGUE TASK FORCE ON 
SOVEREIGN DEBT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SDRM 3 (2008), http://www 
.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Setser_IPD_Debt_SDRM.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/48YN-PEGU] (discussing the “profound difficulties [of] building inter-
national consensus behind any sweeping change in global financial regulation”). 
 37. IMF, PROPOSED FEATURES OF A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
MECHANISM (2003), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203 
.pdf. The SDRM was the brainchild of IMF Deputy Managing Director Anne 
Krueger, inspired by the works of Jeffrey Sachs, the author of this Article, and 
others. See Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for 
Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976–2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470, 470–71, 
490 (2002), http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2002/03/pdf/rogoff.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R5X6-FXJW]. 
 38. SETSER, supra note 36, at 1–2.  
 39. See Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sover-
eign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 391–93 (2005) (arguing that the opposition to 
SDRM by major financial industry associations was a critical factor behind the 
U.S. reversal in position).  
 40. SETSER, supra note 36, at 16–17. 
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legal framework” for sovereign debt restructuring.41 Claiming, 
ironically, that the IMF is a more appropriate venue for this ef-
fort,42 the United States,43 and apparently also the European 
Union,44 have opposed this approach. Absent U.S. and E.U. sup-
port, there is skepticism whether this U.N. effort is feasible—at 
least in the near future.45 
The formality of a treaty can also discourage its adoption. 
Because of the lengthy negotiation process and their binding na-
ture, treaties are not well suited to address an imminent or con-
troversial global crisis.46  
A model-law approach is sometimes attempted when treaty-
making fails. In this context, a model law is proposed legislation, 
having cross-border application, for governments to consider en-
acting as domestic law in their jurisdictions.47 To facilitate cross-
border legal comparability, each government enacting a model 
 
 41. Press Release, Second Comm., Proposal for Sovereign Debt Restructur-
ing Framework Among 6 Draft Texts Approved by Second Committee, U.N. 
Press Release GA/EF/3417 (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ 
gaef3417.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/BB5N-5HXY]. 
 42. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (discussing prior U.S. 
opposition to the IMF’s proposed sovereign-debt-restructuring treaty).  
 43. Press Release, supra note 41 (“Also speaking before the vote, the repre-
sentative of the United States was obliged to vote ‘no’ on the draft resolution as 
there was ongoing work on the technically complex issue in such bodies as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were more appropriate venues.”).  
 44. Italy, speaking on behalf of the European Union, stated that the IMF is 
the “primary forum to discuss sovereign debt restructuring.” Id. 
 45. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Model-
Law Approach, 6 J. GLOBALIZATION & DEV. 343, 353 (2016). 
 46. Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 68, 75 (David Armstrong ed., 2009); cf. Geneviève Saumier, The 
Hague Principles and the Choice of Non-State “Rules of Law” to Govern an In-
ternational Commercial Contract, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2014) (referencing 
“the sometimes stifling methods of treaty-drafting”); Jeffrey S. Peake, The De-
cline of Treaties? Obama, Trump, and the Politics of International Agreements 
7 (Apr. 6, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3153840 
[https://perma.cc/9MFX-449R] (explaining that “[t]he modern treaty process is 
both procedurally and politically cumbersome, especially given the super-ma-
jority requirement for Senate approval”). 
 47. Frequently Asked Questions – UNCITRAL Texts, UNITED NATIONS 
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, https://uncitral.un.org/en/about/faq/texts#model 
[https://perma.cc/YMN3-HPE5] (“A model law is created as a suggested pattern 
for law-makers in national governments to consider adopting as part of their 
domestic legislation.”). 
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law should, ideally, enact the same legislative text; for that rea-
son, model laws are sometimes called uniform laws.48 Whereas 
treaties are binding upon contracting states and may only be 
modified or denounced by a treaty amendment, model laws may 
be amended or denounced unilaterally by a nation without vio-
lating international law.49 By promoting open communication, 
the less formal process of developing and enacting a model law 
can sometimes be more productive than a treaty approach.50  
A model-law approach, however, has its own difficulties. 
Model laws “are often subject to the same political pressures of 
harmonization and the same need to conform to specific legal 
traditions as a treaty or a convention.”51 Governments are also 
reluctant to pioneer law reform.52 For example, CIGI, joined by 
other influential organizations,53 has been attempting to per-
suade governments to enact the Model Law as a model law.54 So 
far, those efforts have been unsuccessful.  
 
 48. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
exemplifies in an international context, and the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) in the United States exemplifies in a subnational context, model laws 
that have been uniformly enacted. 
 49. Giorgio Gaja et al., Instruments for Legal Integration in the European 
Community, in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN 
FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, BOOK 2, at 113, 153–54 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 
1985) (discussing the preference of European countries for conventions as op-
posed to model laws).  
 50. See id. at 154; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insol-
vency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 570–71 (1996) (noting that a treaty is 
harder to implement than a model law). 
 51. Henry Deeb Gabriel, The Advantages of Soft Law in International Com-
mercial Law: The Role of UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, and the Hague Conference, 
34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 655, 666 (2009). 
 52. See, e.g., Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, The 
Politics of Legal Reform, at 27, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/MDPB/G24/17 (2002), 
https://g24.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/17.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH8P 
-SG3V] (observing that “the politics of legal reform are difficult” even when the 
legal reform is desired). 
 53. These other organizations include the Jubilee USA Network, a promi-
nent faith-based NGO. See Financial Crisis 10 Years On. Has the Response to 
2008 Laid the Foundations for the Next?, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT, https:// 
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2018/04/financial-crisis-10-years-response-2008 
-laid-foundations-next/ [https://perma.cc/CY4U-3T36]. 
 54. See, e.g., MAZIAR PEIHANI & KIM JENSEN, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE 
INNOVATION, THE MODEL LAW APPROACH: HOW ONTARIO COULD LEAD THE 
WORLD IN PROVIDING CERTAINTY AND FAIRNESS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUC-
TURING 1 (2017), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 
2017%20SDR%20Round%20Table%20Report%20WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
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Not needing governmental validation or consent, soft law 
can provide rules of conduct when treaty-making and model laws 
fail.55 The adoption of soft law also can help incrementally to de-
velop norms, which governments may later try to codify into 
hard law.56 Until that codification, however, soft-law rules are 
unenforceable and thus second-best to hard law. Nonetheless, 
the ability of parties contractually to choose soft law as govern-
ing law, as this Article proposes, would make that soft law di-
rectly enforceable against those parties.  
II.  SHOULD SOFT-LAW CHOICE OF LAW BE 
ENFORCEABLE? 
This analysis starts by examining the fundamental under-
pinnings of choice of law, which focus on party autonomy.57 It 
then scrutinizes party autonomy to choose soft law under the 
lens of freedom of contracting.58 Finally, it asks whether govern-
mental interest in ensuring legitimate enforcement might limit 
autonomy to choose soft law.59 
 
KV5A-SD5Z] (discussing CIGI’s efforts to educate policy leaders and govern-
ment officials about the advantages of the model-law structure); SCHWARCZ, su-
pra note 14, at 2–5 (educating policymakers and other interested parties on the 
impact of the Model Law and arguing for its enactment). Recall that the Model 
Law would be regarded as an international model law from the perspective of 
governments enacting it but soft law from the perspective of other governments. 
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
 55. See Shelton, supra note 46, at 75–76. 
 56. Cf. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global 
Lawmaking, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851, 852 (2007) (discussing the benefits of 
incrementalism for global insolvency law reform); Gabriel, supra note 51, at 656 
(observing that because soft law is not binding, its “likely effect is more to set 
norms instead of hard and fast rules, but this still achieves the salutary goal of 
creating broad international standards”); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power 
and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
469, 531 (2005) (“[S]tates can be gradually led toward stronger legal rules . . . by 
starting with relatively weak international rules backed by little or no sanctions 
that all states feel comfortable joining, but then gradually pushing states to ac-
cept successively stronger and more challenging requirements.”); John A.E. Pot-
tow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy, 45 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 935, 939 (2005) (observing that UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency “created an opportunity to bridge the theoretical gap between 
universalists and territorialists . . . thus allow[ing] hesitant states to ‘acclimate’ 
to a regime of universalism”). 
 57. See infra Part II.A. 
 58. See infra Part II.B. 
 59. See infra Part II.C. 
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A. PARTY AUTONOMY 
Any analysis of whether soft-law choice of law should be en-
forceable should start with the fundamental underpinnings of 
choice of law. Choice of law traces back to the Roman Empire, 
where Roman citizens, in deciding what law applied to their 
agreements, had the right to choose between Roman law and a 
provincial or barbarous law.60 This principle of autonomy of the 
will became known as the doctrine of party autonomy.61 
Party autonomy became the prevailing doctrine in Europe 
for private international law.62 The doctrine later became part of 
English law after the great eighteenth century jurist Lord Mans-
field cited it with approval.63 Mansfield argued that courts 
should respect the right of parties to choose a state’s internal law 
as the law governing their contract, rather than applying the law 
of the state where the contract is to be performed (lex loci con-
tractus) or the law of the forum state (lex fori).64 Courts in the 
United States subsequently followed Lord Mansfield, making 
party autonomy the dominant common law rule.65  
Attempts by drafters of the First Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws to reject party autonomy were seen as “inconsistent with 
the predominant practice of courts” and deemed untenable,66 
and thus were generally disregarded by courts.67 The current Re-
statement, in contrast, embraces party autonomy,68 which is 
“sometimes viewed as an unqualified good.”69 Conceptually, 
party autonomy is consistent with parties contracting for their 
rights and obligations under private international law.70 Party 
 
 60. BEALE, supra note 32, at 1096. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1097 (observing that Lord Mansfield’s citation of that doctrine, in 
Robinson v. Bland, was merely dicta). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1095, 1097. 
 66. ALEX MILLS, PARTY AUTONOMY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 
(2018). 
 67. See William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative 
Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697, 712 (2001) (noting 
that “[d]espite the First Restatement’s failure to recognize contractual choice of 
law, courts enforced choice of law clauses”). 
 68. Id.; see also infra note 94 and accompanying text.  
 69. Michaels, supra note 7, at 46.  
 70. See id. (discussing party autonomy as “a professorial desire, emerging 
from a long academic tradition particularly in Europe, to ‘privatize’ private law, 
by removing its source from the state and making it independent”). 
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autonomy is also pragmatic. It allows parties to choose the law 
governing their contract, thereby increasing predictability and 
certainty. It also reduces the burden on courts to choose the gov-
erning law when resolving multi-state disputes.71 Accordingly, 
both common law countries and civil law countries now respect 
party autonomy—insofar as it upholds the right of contracting 
parties to choose a state’s internal law as the governing law.72  
Logically, the principles of party autonomy—that the par-
ties should be able to specify their respective rights and obliga-
tions73—should also justify the right of contracting parties to 
choose soft law to govern those rights and obligations.74 Certain 
pragmatic considerations that justify party autonomy—increas-
ing predictability and certainty, and reducing the burden on 
courts—likewise should justify choosing soft law.75 Honoring 
“freely negotiated choice-of-law clauses in order to secure the 
conditions necessary for the functioning of international com-
merce . . . benefits [states] even if at times their law is not ap-
plied.”76 The Restatement of Conflict of Laws supports these  
considerations: 
  Prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified expecta-
tions of the parties and to make it possible for them to foretell with 
accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities under the contract. 
These objectives may best be attained in multistate transactions by let-
ting the parties choose the law to govern the validity of the contract 
and the rights created thereby. In this way, certainty and predictability 
of result are most likely to be secured.77 
 
 71. Willis L.M. Reese, Power of Parties to Choose Law Governing Their Con-
tract, 54 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 49, 51 (1960). 
 72. Id.; cf. MILLS, supra note 66, at 3 (observing that party autonomy’s 
longstanding history alone has made the doctrine justifiable and nearly  
uncontested).  
 73. Cf. BEALE, supra note 32, at 1096 (arguing that, “in the case of all vol-
untary obligations, parties, since they have the right to choose whether or not 
they will be bound, have also the right to choose the law under which they shall 
be bound”); supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (explaining why party 
autonomy is conceptually consistent with private international law). 
 74. See Symeonides, supra note 27, at 895 (suggesting that party autonomy 
should justify the right of contracting parties to choose soft law as their  
governing law). 
 75. See Reese, supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 76. Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles Between 
States: Justifying Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 381, 394 (2008). 
 77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187.2 cmt. e (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977). 
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The only practical concern with allowing parties to choose 
soft law is whether that “law” can be “found” with clarity.78 In 
contrast to soft law, state law usually is “published and may 
serve as precedent.”79 As a policy matter, giving parties the right 
to choose soft law as governing law would be counterproductive 
if that leads to effort or unpredictability that overburdens the 
courts.80 The arbitration precedents address this concern, how-
ever, recognizing that soft law, especially if codified, often can be 
found with clarity.81 Even when drawing from uncodified bodies 
of soft law, arbitrators have been able to use “reason and logic” 
to interpret the rules from the business context and common val-
ues shared by the business community.82 Soft law that is clear 
and accessible therefore ought to satisfy this concern.83  
From the perspective of party autonomy, therefore, the same 
considerations that justify choosing a state’s internal law should 
 
 78. Cf. Gama, Jr. & Saumier, supra note 11, at 51–52 (arguing that allow-
ing for the choice of non-state law would “promote[ ] the stability of the parties’ 
expectations under their contract, even though non-State law is arguably more 
difficult to ascertain and may provide less valuable information than the lex fori 
in terms of future legal treatment”). 
 79. Michaels, supra note 7, at 47 (observing the need for doctrinal  
accuracy). 
 80. See Reese, supra note 71, at 51 (discussing the policy goal of reducing 
the burden on courts). It could be burdensome, for example, if parties choose 
soft law written in a language different than that of the contract.  
 81. Gabrielle Kauffman-Kohler, Soft Law in International Arbitration: 
Codification and Normativity, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 283, 295–98 (2010); 
see Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: 
A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
657, 711 (1999) (observing that arbitrators have little difficulty in applying soft-
law rules or principles when they are definitive).  
 82. Maniruzzaman, supra note 81, at 713–14. 
 83. In some cases, soft law may even provide rules of conduct that provide 
more clarity than hard law. In the context of international investment arbitra-
tion, for example, Professor Alvarez observes that “investment tribunals regu-
larly cite to soft law” because the “rudimentary nature of international invest-
ment law . . . drives all [ ] stakeholders to anything that might fill the 
interpretative gaps.” Alvarez, supra note 10, at 17; cf. Anna Gelpern, The Im-
portance of Being Standard, in ESCB LEGAL CONFERENCE 2016, at 23 (2017), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/escblegalconference2016_201702.en 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XN8-TYT4] (arguing for adopting a more centralized, 
modular approach to contracting incorporating by reference soft law that sets 
forth widely-used non-financial terms). Nonetheless, Alvarez worries that reli-
ance on soft law can “run[ ] contrary to the need states and investors have for 
textually clear rules laid out in advance.” Alvarez, supra note 10, at 60.  
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justify choosing soft law that is clear and accessible. Conceptu-
ally, however, party autonomy is related to, if not a subset of, 
freedom of contracting.84 To ensure a complete analysis, this Ar-
ticle next examines how freedom of contracting might influence 
the right to choose soft law as governing law. 
B. FREEDOM OF CONTRACTING 
Scholars traditionally have distinguished freedom of con-
tracting and party autonomy.85 The distinction, however, is sub-
tle; freedom of contracting is limited by mandatory rules of local 
law,86 whereas party autonomy is limited by private interna-
tional law, which respects overriding mandatory rules of local 
law.87 The latter has been defined, with some circularity, as rules 
that “are deemed so important that they should be applied to a 
(cross-border) case by a court, even if the issue is, in principle, 
governed by another law according to the choice of law rules of 
the forum.”88 
For example, freedom of contracting would not allow parties 
to contract around mandatory local law that protects parties who 
are infants.89 In contrast, party autonomy would allow parties to 
choose a governing law that does not protect infants, subject to 
a court limiting that choice under private international law by 
 
 84. See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (explaining why the dis-
tinction between party autonomy and freedom of contracting is subtle); infra 
notes 94–95 and accompanying text (discussing the close relationship between 
party autonomy and freedom of contracting). 
 85. MILLS, supra note 66, at 21–23; see E-mail from Ralf Michaels, Arthur 
Larson Professor of Law, Duke Law Sch., to author (Oct. 19, 2018) (on file with 
author) (stating that he does “not think freedom to choose the applicable law is 
a part of freedom of contract” and that “[w]e distinguish normally in conflict of 
laws”). Recall that party autonomy refers to the right of parties to choose the 
governing law in private international law. See supra notes 60–61 and accom-
panying text. 
 86. In this Article, “local law” means the applicable national law absent a 
choice of law. See Local Law, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020) 
(defining “local law” as including “the laws and legal principles and rules of a 
state other than those concerned with conflict[ ] of law[s]”). 
 87. MILLS, supra note 66, at 21; cf. UGLJESA GRUSIC ET AL., CHESHIRE, 
NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 743–51 (Paul Torremans & 
James J. Fawcett eds., 15th ed. 2017) (discussing overriding mandatory rules of 
local law, and observing that such rules create an “exception to the normal 
choice of law rules”).  
 88. LOUWRENS R. KIESTRA, THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2014). 
 89. MILLS, supra note 66, at 348. 
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finding that the mandatory local law protecting infants is an 
overriding mandatory local law.90 What constitutes overriding 
mandatory local law under private international law might also 
depend on agreements among the relevant nations, some of 
which include not only mandatory local law of the forum but also 
mandatory local law having a connection to the contract.91 Sub-
ject to this subtle distinction,92 party autonomy functionally 
should follow freedom of contracting.93  
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws similarly views party 
autonomy as consistent with, if not part of, freedom of contract-
ing. It comments that “letting the parties choose the law to gov-
ern the validity of the contract and the rights created thereby 
[is] . . . consistent with the fact that . . . persons are free within 
broad limits to determine the nature of their contractual obliga-
tions.”94 Likewise, Professor Reese, the Restatement’s Chief Re-
porter, concludes that “[d]oubt as to the parties’ ability to choose 
the governing law arises only with respect to questions that lie 
beyond their contractual power.”95  
 
 90. Id. at 478–79. 
 91. KIESTRA, supra note 88, at 24. Agreements among nations might pro-
vide, for example, that private international law should respect local law rules 
on consumer protection, see Laura Maria van Bochove, Overriding Mandatory 
Rules as a Vehicle for Weaker Party Protection in European Private Interna-
tional Law, 7 ERASMUS L. REV. 147, 149 n.18 (2014), or “safeguard[ ] public in-
terests.” See, e.g., Naciye Yilmaz, Overriding Mandatory Rules in Private Inter-
national Law, ERDEM & ERDEM L. (July 2015), http://www.erdem-erdem.av.tr/ 
publications/law-post/overriding-mandatory-rules-in-private-international 
-law/ [https://perma.cc/VJQ3-DY99] (quoting Regulation No. 593/2008, supra 
note 24, art. 9(1)). 
 92. The distinction thus effectively turns on the difference, if any, between 
applicable mandatory rules of local law and overriding mandatory rules of local 
law. Professor Mills comments that this distinction could be much more signif-
icant for a legal system that has “a relatively low level of freedom of contract, 
invalidating many potential contractual terms.” Email from Alex Mills, supra 
note 9. A choice of foreign law might then enable the contracting parties to val-
idly include those terms. Id. 
 93. Cf. MARIA HOOK, THE CHOICE OF LAW CONTRACT 12, 26 (2016) (calling 
for a perspective that views choice of law and contract law as a fused “choice of 
law contract,” and arguing that agreement to choice of law is itself a contract 
and that party autonomy in contracting is determinative in the choice-of-law 
process); Lehmann, supra note 76, at 390 (arguing that freedom of contracting 
might be an expansive, universal principle of law into which contractual choice 
of law should fall). 
 94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) cmt. e (AM. 
LAW INST. 1971). 
 95. Reese, supra note 71, at 51. 
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Freedom of contracting is generally subject to three limita-
tions: paternalism, externalities, and public policy.96 Paternal-
ism should not apply in this Article’s context of business con-
tracting, assuming (as normally would be the case) that the 
parties are sophisticated.97 It certainly should not apply to choos-
ing the Model Law as the governing law of sovereign debt con-
tracts; such contracts normally involve a sovereign debtor state 
and sophisticated investors who are represented by counsel.98  
However, the limitations imposed by externalities and pub-
lic policy could apply to business contracting. First, consider ex-
ternalities. Not all externalities defeat contract enforcement. To 
the contrary, many contracts create externalities, yet they are 
enforced.99 When examining externalities, the critical questions 
are which externalities should defeat contract enforcement and 
under what circumstances.100 Unfortunately, “[d]etermining 
which of these [externality] impacts, if negative, are to count in 
constraining the ability of parties to contract with each other 
poses major conceptual problems.”101  
 
 96. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy 
Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 535–39 (1999). 
 97. Cf. HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, art. 1(1) at 17 (providing that the 
Hague Principles apply to contracts “where each party is acting in the exercise 
of its trade or profession” but “do not apply to consumer or employment con-
tracts”); Symeon C. Symeonides, Contracts Subject to Non-State Norms, 54 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 209, 224 (2006) (observing that “it is highly preferable to not allow 
choice of non-state norms in consumer . . . and other contracts in which one 
party is likely to be in a weak bargaining position”). 
 98. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: 
An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 930 (2004) 
(“Sovereign bond contracts are a special breed of contract. The parties involved 
are among the most sophisticated in the world financial markets . . . .”); cf. 
Woodward, Jr., supra note 67, at 713 (“Comparable latitude is given to the par-
ties’ ability to choose the law that will govern the transaction in the sophisti-
cated areas of investment securities and letters of credit. Similarly, four com-
mercial states have mandated that their courts uphold contractual choice of 
‘unrelated’ law in large contracts.”). But cf. William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding 
the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. 
L.J. 1, 42 (2006) (arguing that the doctrine of unconscionability, which derives 
from paternalism in contract law, could be applied to unfair choice-of-law 
clauses). 
 99. Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 551–52. 
 100. Id. at 552.  
 101. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 20 
(1993). 
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Because this Article focuses on business contracting, it need 
not attempt to solve those major conceptual problems. If all con-
tracting parties agree to a soft-law choice of law, there are, by 
definition, no externalities to those parties. Although that agree-
ment might impose externalities on other parties, this Article 
later shows that business contracts are unlikely to cause signif-
icant third-party externalities.102 Insignificant externalities cer-
tainly should not limit freedom of contracting. 
Public policy also could limit freedom of contract and hence 
party autonomy.103 Although most legal rules are regarded as 
“default” rules that parties should be able to contract around, 
some rules are so essential to the legal scheme that they are re-
garded as mandatory. Local law prohibits parties from contract-
ing around mandatory rules.104 As later discussed, however, par-
ties to business contracts are unlikely to want to disobey such 
mandatory rules.105  
In most cases, therefore, the principles of party autonomy 
and freedom of contracting should respect the right of sophisti-
cated parties to choose soft law as the governing law of their 
business contracts. The discussion next explains, however, why 
that right might be limited by the need for legitimacy.  
C. LEGITIMACY 
Recall that the limited non-arbitration precedents for choos-
ing soft law as governing law apply to soft law in only three 
cases: if the soft law either is promulgated by a leading intergov-
ernmental authority, generally accepted (as neutral and bal-
anced), or a trade code.106 These precedents implicitly recognize 
 
 102. See infra Part IV. 
 103. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 104. Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 529 n.69; cf. supra notes 86–91 and accom-
panying text (comparing mandatory rules of local law and overriding mandatory 
rules of local law).  
 105. See infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text (discussing the reputa-
tional and other costs of disobeying mandatory rules). Some authors distinguish 
mandatory rules and public policy. See, e.g., Symeonides, supra note 97, at 224; 
Michal Wojewoda, Mandatory Rules in Private International Law, 7 MAAS-
TRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 183, 193 (2000) (observing that when overriding 
mandatory local law does not apply, a court may still override choice of law when 
it affronts the ordre public of the forum). That distinction, however, is not mean-
ingful for this Article. Cf. HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, cmt. ¶ 11.11 (de-
scribing overriding mandatory rules and public policy as sharing “the same doc-
trinal basis and, in effect, [being] two sides of the same coin”). 
 106. See supra notes 21–29 and accompanying text. 
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that states will only enforce what they deem to be legitimate.107 
If parties want a state to enforce their choice of soft law as gov-
erning law, they effectively must persuade state authorities to 
trust “the legitimacy” of enforcing that choice.108  
In the Western world, legitimacy is largely founded on trust 
in institutional arrangements.109 Each of the aforesaid prece-
dents—promulgation by a leading intergovernmental authority, 
general acceptance, or being a trade code—derives its legitimacy 
from institutional trust. The Article next examines these prece-
dents and considers other possible ways of achieving legitimacy.  
1. Promulgation by a Leading Intergovernmental Authority.  
Certain intergovernmental organizations, such as the Inter-
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNI-
DROIT)110 and the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL),111 are highly respected worldwide. 
Their endorsement of a body of soft law would almost automati-
cally impart it with a high degree of reputational legitimacy.112  
 
 107. Cf. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 311, 502 (2002) (recognizing that enforcement of a judgment rendered 
by a non-state community “is limited by the willingness of others to accept the 
judgment as normatively legitimate”). The possibility that enforcement could 
avoid certain mandatory rules of local law could enhance the need for legiti-
macy. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
 108. Berman, supra note 107, at 325, 511, 532. 
 109. Fritz W. Scharpf, Problem-Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Ac-
countability in the EU 1–2 (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Soc’ys, Cologne, 
Working Paper No. 03/1, 2003); cf. Hans Gribnau, Soft Law and Taxation: EU 
and International Aspects, 2 LEGISPRUDENCE 67, 116 (2008) (arguing that the 
legitimacy of E.U. tax soft-law instruments can be enhanced through increased 
transparency, achieved by public participation, and the consultation of stake-
holders); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 187, 213, 257–58 (2000) (discussing how the Internet Corporation for As-
signed Names and Numbers (ICANN), the public-private organization oversee-
ing parts of the internet, has attempted to enhance its legitimacy by gaining the 
consensus of the international Internet community). 
 110. UNIDROIT was originally founded in 1926 as an auxiliary body of the 
League of Nations. History and Overview, UNIDROIT, https://www.unidroit 
.org/about-unidroit/overview [https://perma.cc/8UPD-4WFE].  
 111. UNCITRAL was created to modernize and harmonize rules on interna-
tional business. Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL, 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/about/faq/mandate_composition [https://perma.cc/ 
8X4E-YRZ3]. 
 112. Cf. SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 407 (arguing for the legitimacy of 
soft-law “norms . . . drafted by intergovernmental bodies such as UNIDROIT 
and UNCITRAL”). 
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Even if less institutional, certain intergovernmental bodies 
may merit respect by virtue of their creation, composition, or 
work product. Professor Symeonides argues, for example, that 
soft law drafted by an impartial intergovernmental body—such 
as the Lando Commission, formed by the European Parliament 
in 1982 to develop a European code for contract law—could have 
legitimacy.113  
Some, however, might judge legitimacy not by the reputa-
tion of the organization promulgating the soft law but by the 
fairness of the soft law itself. Professor Alvarez, for example, ar-
gues that “soft law produced by more public and global institu-
tions like the UN or the ILO does not necessarily enhance [its] 
democratic legitimacy”114 because “[g]lobal processes within UN 
system institutions . . . replicate the standards favored by West-
ern governments to enhance their own interests.”115  
2. General Acceptance.  
Something that is generally accepted is, almost by defini-
tion, seen as legitimate. The UCP, for example, is easily the 
world’s most generally accepted body of commercial soft law.116 
Most nations respect the ability of parties to choose the UCP as 
the law governing their international letters of credit,117 not-
 
 113. Id. at 406–07. 
 114. Alvarez, supra note 10, at 62. 
 115. Id. (citing an example in which soft law high-quality labor standards 
work “almost everywhere against developing countries”). 
 116. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 117. See, e.g., Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 
813, 816 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that over 140 countries had adopted the 
UCP and that the UCP governs most international letters of credit); Paolo S. 
Grassi, Letter of Credit Transactions: The Banks’ Position in Determining Doc-
umentary Compliance. A Comparative Evaluation Under U.S., Swiss and Ger-
man Law, 7 PACE INT’L L. REV. 81, 104–05, 104 n.62 (1995) (discussing the UCP 
and its express and implied application to letters of credit); Charmian Wang 
Corne, Rethinking the Law of Letters of Credit 38–85 (2003) (unpublished doc-
toral thesis) (on file with the University of Sydney), https://ses.library.usyd 
.edu.au/bitstream/handle/2123/660/adt-NU20051027.16310703chapter2 
.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/2G7L-3V7L] (summarizing the 
development of the UCP and its general acceptance within the international 
letter-of-credit community). 
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withstanding that it is merely a set of rules published by the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce (ICC),118 a private-sector or-
ganization.119 Relatively few bodies of soft law, however, appear 
to be generally accepted. Also, except for cases where it is obvi-
ous,120 general acceptance is a somewhat ambiguous standard.121 
Under political pressure, the requirement that generally ac-
cepted soft law also be neutral and balanced was added to the 
Hague Principles.122 Whether that addition actually increases le-
gitimacy is unclear; if anything, it might increase ambiguity.123 
Professor Michaels argues, for example, that there is no clear 
basis to assess whether any given body of soft law is neutral and 
balanced.124 This Article’s normative framework will focus 
simply on whether the soft law is generally accepted, without 
that addition.  
3. Trade Code.  
The UCP gains legitimacy not only by being generally ac-
cepted. It also is a trade code: “an international body of trade 
practice that is commonly adopted by international and domestic 
letters of credit and as such is the ‘law of the transaction’ by 
 
 118. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, I.C.C. PUB. NO. 600, UNIFORM CUSTOMS 
AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (2007).  
 119. See History, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://iccwbo.org/about-us/ 
who-we-are/history/ [https://perma.cc/7AJH-7N7Y] (describing the ICC as a pri-
vate-sector organization that strives to set global standards for business). 
 120. Besides the UCP, the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
another obvious case. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra  
note 2. 
 121. MILLS, supra note 66, at 505 (arguing that what general “[a]cceptance 
on an ‘international, supranational or regional level’ . . . means is opaque”); 
Michaels, supra note 7, at 59 (arguing that, in most contexts, “generally ac-
cepted” is a “vague standard”). Professor Mills explains why that standard is 
ambiguous:  
It is unclear, for example, whether this [standard] requires acceptance 
only by those subject to the non-state rules, or by society in general—
the former might not be enough to establish that the rules are generally 
considered legitimate, but the latter might be too difficult to satisfy. 
Islamic law, for example, is certainly accepted by Muslims (albeit sub-
ject to different interpretations), but its application is broadly rejected 
in most Western states—it is unclear whether it would satisfy this test.  
MILLS, supra note 66, at 505.  
 122. See infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.  
 123. See MILLS, supra note 66, at 506 (explaining why the neutral-and-bal-
anced “criterion is . . . likely to present difficulties in application”). 
 124. Michaels, supra note 7, at 57–68. 
  
2492 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2471 
 
agreement of the parties.”125 Relatively few bodies of soft law, 
however, represent trade codes or are likely to be redacted into 
trade codes in the foreseeable future.126 
4. Other Possible Ways To Achieve Legitimacy.  
Another way for soft law to achieve legitimacy is for national 
law to explicitly authorize its application. In the United States, 
for example, the UCC authorizes parties to make their letters of 
credit subject to the UCP: “the liability of an issuer [of a letter of 
credit] is governed by any rules of custom or practice, such as the 
[UCP], to which the letter of credit . . . is expressly made sub-
ject.”127 If a nation explicitly were to authorize parties to choose 
a particular body of soft law as their sovereign debt contract’s 
governing law, that choice would be enforceable—at least in that 
nation’s courts. Explicit authorization of soft law, however, is  
unusual.  
Arguably,128 soft law might also achieve legitimacy by being 
fair.129 Under the Hague Principles, for example, the European 
Union feared that allowing parties to choose generally accepted 
soft law—the originally proposed standard—still could give rise 
to “the proliferation of unfair unilateral rules.”130 To address po-
tential unfairness, the EU required that such soft law also be 
 
 125. U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 126. Professor Alvarez suggests an area where soft law might become re-
dacted into a trade code: “developments with respect to digital data where hard 
law is severely lagging behind real world commercial/technical developments.” 
E-mail from José Enrique Alvarez, Herbert & Rose Rubin Professor of Int’l Law, 
N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Dec. 17, 2018) (on file with author).  
 127. U.C.C. § 5-116(c). 
 128. Jurisprudentially, fairness signals legitimacy. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, 
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 25–46 (1995). Some none-
theless might argue that fairness is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
legitimacy.  
 129. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text (arguing that the legit-
imacy of soft law should be judged by its fairness, not by the reputation of the 
organization promulgating it). Efficacy might also arguably be viewed as a basis 
of legitimacy of soft law. See Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up Lawmaking 
Through a Pluralist Lens: The ICC Banking Commission and the Transnational 
Regulation of Letters of Credit, 57 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1155 & n.10 (2008) (arguing 
that the efficacy of soft law can be a basis for it to harden into hard law). 
 130. Saumier, supra note 46, at 12–13. 
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“neutral and balanced.”131 As observed, however, it is unclear 
how to determine that.132 
Indeed, absent a body of soft law being manifestly fair,133 it 
is unclear how to determine its substantive fairness. The inabil-
ity to assess substantive fairness may well force the legitimacy 
analysis back to one of institutional trust134—effectively a test of 
procedural fairness. Professor Michaels thus argues that fair-
ness “must be understood in a formal, not a substantive way,” 
permitting soft law to “be chosen only when it has been formu-
lated by an agency that is, with regard to the parties, neutral.”135 
That test could be met, he contends, if “an agency could claim to 
represent either all parties (like the ICC with regard to commer-
cial actors) or none (like UNIDROIT).”136  
Because private organizations can promulgate soft law,137 
procedural fairness should not be limited to trust in intergovern-
mental organizations.138 It should also extend to the private sec-
tor, reflecting an evolution from the “assumption that state rep-
resentatives most legitimately represent the people” to 
recognition that “[i]n an increasingly complex society . . . author-
ity flows from other sources too, both public and private, in par-
ticular, expertise, knowledge, or acceptance by affected stake-
holders.”139 Professor Michaels implicitly recognizes this by 
using the example of the ICC, a private-sector organization,140 
 
 131. As discussed, Article 3 of the Hague Principles now includes this neu-
tral-and-balanced requirement. See supra notes 29, 122 and accompanying text; 
see also Michaels, supra note 7, at 55. 
 132. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
 133. This would require the soft law to be very obviously and clearly per-
ceived as fair. See Manifestly, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary 
.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/manifestly [https://perma.cc/8457-N77C] (de-
fining “manifestly” as “very obviously”). In this sense, manifest fairness, like 
pornography, may be characterized by an “I know it when I see it” test. See 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 134. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 135. Michaels, supra note 7, at 58. 
 136. Id. at 59 (describing this as “a relative concept of neutrality: Islamic law 
becomes neutral and balanced as between Muslims but loses that character as 
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim”). 
 137. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing soft law promul-
gated by the ICC). 
 138. Cf. supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining why soft law pro-
duced by intergovernmental organizations might not even enhance democratic 
legitimacy). 
 139. Pauwelyn et al., supra note 9, at 742. 
 140. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
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as meriting institutional trust.141 Professor Symeonides likewise 
observes that soft law drafted by an impartial academic organi-
zation could have legitimacy.142 A fairness test for legitimacy log-
ically should turn, therefore, on the neutrality of the body prom-
ulgating the soft law, whether or not that body is 
governmental.143  
Arbitration precedents might also inform the question of le-
gitimacy.144 Parties to arbitration “have always had the power to 
authorize the arbitral tribunal to decide their dispute ex aequo 
et bono, that is, according to what is just and fair, without refer-
ence to any state law.”145 Therefore, Professor Symeonides ar-
gues, “[a] fortiori, [those] parties have the power to authorize the 
[arbitral] tribunal to decide according to a designated set of non-
state norms.”146 These considerations, however, largely parallel 
the prior discussion of legitimacy. The “just and fair” condition 
would appear to be subject to the same lack of clarity about how 
a body of soft law should be assessed to be fair, possibly forcing 
the legitimacy analysis back to one of institutional trust.147 The 
“nonstate norms” condition suggests the body of soft law should 
 
 141. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 142. SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 406–07 (noting also that soft law pro-
posed by a partisan private organization would, in contrast, lack legitimacy).  
 143. This Article does not adopt a more aggressive view of fairness suggested 
by Michaels and Symeonides; rather, it presumes fairness if the contracting 
parties are sophisticated. Symeonides observes, for example, that “[o]nce the 
weak parties are segregated and protected, then one can allow the contractual 
choice of non-state norms in all other contracts . . . .” Symeonides, supra note 
97, at 226. Similarly, Michaels observes that “it is not clear at all why the par-
ties, whose autonomy is otherwise emphasized, must be restricted to the choice 
of a balanced law at all.” Michaels, supra note 7, at 58. Under that presumption, 
soft law chosen by sophisticated parties to business contracts would always be 
deemed fair. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (restricting this Article’s 
analysis to sophisticated parties to business contracts). 
 144. Recall that significant precedent supports choosing soft law as govern-
ing law for purposes of arbitration. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 145. SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 409. 
 146. Id. Professor Symeonides elsewhere suggests that allowing non-state-
law choice of law in arbitration “can be defended [in the abstract] on grounds of 
contractual intent . . . since an arbitration agreement reflects the parties’ ex-
plicit intent to go outside the state judicial system . . . .” Symeonides, supra note 
97, at 225. 
 147. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
  
2020] SOFT LAW AS GOVERNING LAW 2495 
 
be accepted as a norm, which implies it should have at least some 
general acceptance.148  
The possibility, however, that arbitration might require less 
of a practical showing of legitimacy for choosing soft law raises 
an interesting “bootstrap” question: should the fact that a body 
of soft law provides that all disputes thereunder be resolved 
through arbitration justify choosing that soft law as governing 
law? The Model Law itself provides, for example, that “[a]ll dis-
putes arising [thereunder] shall be resolved by binding arbitra-
tion before a panel of three arbitrators.”149  
The answer would appear to be no. The arbitration excep-
tion applies to the rules by which arbitrators actually adjudicate 
a dispute.150 The exception does not appear to apply to choosing 
the substantive rules that govern the rights and obligations of 
contract parties in the first place.151 The mere fact that a con-
tract contemplates arbitration of disputes should not be a basis 
for altering the underlying rights and obligations of the par-
ties.152 Altering rights on that basis could cause confusion; for 
 
 148. Cf. Symeon C. Symeonides, Contracts Subject to Non-State Norms, AM. 
J. COMP. L. 209, 211 (2006) (arguing that “what makes the [arbitration agree-
ment’s selecting of] nonstate norms binding is not the parties’ volition alone, but 
rather the willingness of a state to enforce a contract that incorporates these 
norms”). 
 149. SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, app., ch. V, art. 10, § 1. 
 150. See SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 487 (explaining that parties have 
wide power to choose the law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal). The Model 
Law itself provides that flexibility:  
The arbitration shall be governed by [generally accepted international 
arbitration rules of (name of neutral international arbitration body)] 
[the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes/ International Centre for Dispute Resolution/ International 
Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration/ specify 
other international arbitration organization]. Notwithstanding Article 
10(2), if all the parties to an arbitration contractually agree that such 
arbitration shall be governed by other rules, it shall be so governed.  
SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, app., ch. V, art. 10, §§ 2–3. 
 151. An arbitration agreement or clause pointing to a specific governing law 
(e.g., the Model Law) does not necessarily determine the law that will govern 
the contract outside of the arbitration process. For example, the doctrine of sep-
arability, observed in the United States as well as in many transnational and 
foreign arbitration regimes, holds that the law governing an arbitration agree-
ment or clause can be separate from the law governing the main contract. 
SYMEONIDES, supra note 18, at 473.  
 152. But see Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. 
REV. 265, 266 (2015) (finding that firms have committed arbitration bootstrap-
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example, if an arbitration provision is not upheld and the dispute 
goes to a court, the parties’ rights and obligations could be retro-
actively changed.153  
Ironically, the potential for arbitration itself to cause that 
confusion militates in favor of courts respecting a choice of soft 
law as governing law. Although arbitral tribunals respect a 
choice of non-state law,154 a court that finds an arbitration agree-
ment invalid and hears the same dispute on the merits rarely 
would give effect to that choice of law—thereby altering the par-
ties’ rights.155 If courts respected a choice of soft law, however, 
those rights would not become altered (thereby avoiding  
confusion).156 
5. Proposing a Choice-of-Law Framework.  
Synthesizing the foregoing analysis, sophisticated parties to 
business contracts should have the right to choose soft law as 
governing law157 if (1) the choice of law does not create signifi-
cant externalities (or the social benefits of that choice are likely 
to exceed those externalities);158 (2) the soft law is clear and ac-
cessible;159 and (3) the soft law has legitimacy by virtue of being 
either generally accepted,160 promulgated by a respected inde-
pendent and unbiased organization, or manifestly fair.161 
 
ping by including substantive contract terms having nothing to do with arbitra-
tion (e.g., statute of limitations and reduced damages) in arbitration clauses in 
the hope that courts will enforce them based on the Supreme Court’s extreme 
deference to arbitration clauses). 
 153. Cf. Saumier, supra note 46, at 19–21 (citations omitted) (observing that 
if “parties have included [an arbitration] choice of law clause in their contract 
designating [a body of soft law] to govern their contract, this choice would not 
be effective if a dispute is brought before a State court. . . . What might justify 
this inconsistency in the State’s own approach to choice-of-law in international 
commercial contracts?”). 
 154. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. 
 155. See E-mail from Alex Mills, supra note 9; supra notes 145–47 and ac-
companying text. 
 156. E-mail from Alex Mills, supra note 9. 
 157. This right to choose soft law as governing law includes, of course, the 
right to choose soft law as all or part of the governing law. See supra note 30 
and accompanying text. 
 158. These restrictions on externalities provide a safe harbor, not an abso-
lute condition, because significant externalities do not always limit freedom of 
contracting. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.  
 159. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 160. Supra Part II.C.2. 
 161. Legitimacy also should require the soft law not to be manifestly unfair. 
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III.  SHOULD SOFT-LAW INCORPORATION BY 
REFERENCE BE ENFORCEABLE? 
As an alternative analytical framework, next consider incor-
porating soft law by reference into a contract. Technically, incor-
poration by reference is not a choice-of-law rule.162 It is “merely 
a shorthand way of drafting the contract, equivalent in legal ef-
fect to cutting and pasting the text of those rules [of soft law] into 
the pages of the contract.”163  
The analysis of whether soft-law incorporation by reference 
should be enforceable first addresses autonomy and freedom of 
contracting and then addresses legitimacy. 
A. AUTONOMY AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACTING 
Reflecting widespread contract-law precedent,164 the Re-
statement observes that parties may incorporate by reference ex-
trinsic material.165 The Restatement goes further than most 
such precedent, however, by including “provisions of . . . foreign 
law” as an example of extrinsic material: “[P]arties, generally 
speaking, have power to determine the terms of their contractual 
engagements. They may spell out these terms in the contract. In 
 
Assuming the contracting parties are sophisticated (so they do not take unfair 
advantage of each other), the condition that the choice of soft law not create 
significant externalities (or the social benefits of that choice are likely to exceed 
those externalities) should assure there is no manifest unfairness. See supra 
notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
 162. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 1971) (stating that incorporation by reference “is not a rule of 
choice of law”).  
 163. MILLS, supra note 66, at 23.  
 164. Incorporation by reference traces back over a century. See Incorpora-
tion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 613 (2d ed. 1910) (defining “incorporation by 
reference” within the definition of “incorporation”). Incorporation by reference 
is also an integral concept in “traditional contracts.” Richard Raysman & Peter 
Brown, Incorporation by Reference Provision in Related Agreement Allows for 
Enforcement of Warranty Disclaimer in Subsequent Software License, 




 165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) cmt. c (articu-
lating the principle justifying Subsection (1), which allows application of a cho-
sen state law to govern the contractual rights and duties if “the particular issue 
is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their 
agreement directed to that issue”). 
  
2498 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2471 
 
the alternative, they may incorporate into the contract by refer-
ence extrinsic material which may, among other things, be the 
provisions of some foreign law.”166  
If parties may incorporate by reference provisions of foreign 
law, they also should have the right, by analogy, to incorporate 
by reference soft law.167 Both represent rules of conduct that, ab-
sent such incorporation by reference, would be unenforceable.168  
A more normative analysis also supports that view. Because 
incorporation by reference is not a choice-of-law rule,169 the 
party-autonomy jurisprudence should not apply.170 The freedom-
of-contracting jurisprudence should apply, however, because in-
corporation by reference is contractual.171 Logically, that free-
dom-of-contracting jurisprudence would apply to incorporating 
soft law by reference the same way it applies to choosing soft law 
as governing law.172 That, in turn, should lead to a similar con-
clusion: that the incorporation by reference of soft law into busi-
ness contracts should be respected under contract theory.173  
However, because the party-autonomy jurisprudence does 
not apply,174 incorporating soft law by reference would not gain 
 
 166. Id. (emphasis added).  
 167. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Scope and Limits of Party Autonomy 
in International Contracts: A Comparative Analysis, in PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES AND CONTINUING RELEVANCE 101, 
127 n.155 (Franco Ferrari & Diego Fernandez Arroyo eds., 2019) (arguing that 
the extrinsic material referenced in that Restatement comment “can also be 
a . . . collection of non-state norms”). 
 168. See Andre Sobczak, Are Codes of Conduct in Global Supply Chains Re-
ally Voluntary? From Soft Law Regulations of Labour Relations to Consumer 
Law, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 167, 171 (2006) (“Corporate codes of conduct are usually 
considered as ethical commitments without any legal effect. At best, they form 
part of the category of soft law, and constitute norms without legally binding 
effect . . . .”). 
 169. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (identifying the restatement 
provision distinguishing choice-of-law doctrine from incorporation by reference). 
 170. Cf. supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text (discussing party auton-
omy as choice-of-law doctrine).  
 171. Robert Whitman, Incorporation by Reference in Commercial Contracts, 
21 MD. L. REV. 1 (1961) (describing incorporation by reference as a device for 
alleviating contractual complexity). 
 172. See supra notes 96–105 and accompanying text (detailing limitations 
inherent in freedom-of-contracting jurisprudence). 
 173. See supra Part II.B (concluding that a soft-law choice of law should be 
respected under freedom of contracting). 
 174. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text (referring to a Restate-
ment provision distinguishing between party autonomy and incorporation by 
reference). 
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a possible advantage provided by that jurisprudence: the ability 
of the chosen soft law to avoid the application of mandatory rules 
imposed under local law.175 Professor Michaels explains the dis-
tinction:  
This is an important difference. If a body of rules is merely incorpo-
rated, the whole contract (including the incorporated rules) remains 
governed by a state’s law, including its mandatory rules. Where, by con-
trast, a body of rules is chosen in the sense of choice of law, that body 
becomes the applicable contract law . . . .176 
The Restatement also illustrates this difference. It would ex-
clude, for example, an incorporation by reference of an unrelated 
state’s law into a trust agreement in order to pay the trustee a 
commission that would exceed the maximum permitted local-law 
rate.177  
In reality, this difference is likely to be insignificant for sev-
eral reasons. Party autonomy is itself limited by private interna-
tional law, which respects overriding mandatory rules of local 
law.178 Also, for reputational and other reasons, parties to busi-
ness contracts rarely would want, much less try, to disobey man-
datory rules of local law.179 Most companies in fact make special 
efforts to demonstrate that they are socially responsible.180 Fur-
thermore, there is “not a large difference” between issues that 
parties could resolve explicitly by contract (and thus could be re-
solved through incorporation by reference) and those that are 
subject to mandatory rules.181 
 
 175. See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text (discussing the capacity 
of party-autonomy jurisprudence to override mandatory provisions of local law).  
 176. Michaels, supra note 7, at 44 (emphasis added). 
 177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. c, illus. 
4–5 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (detailing a hypothetical wherein an attempt to incor-
porate an unrelated state’s law is excluded). 
 178. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the deference paid 
by private international law to mandatory local law).  
 179. See, e.g., Kevin Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and 
Reputational Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 85–87 (2010) (discussing 
tenacious attacks on the reputation of global companies accused of trying to cir-
cumvent mandatory local laws, addressing such things as child labor, fair 
wages, and workplace conditions).  
 180. Id. (discussing how companies have been affirmatively protecting their 
reputations by voluntarily taking steps to demonstrate accountability and cor-
porate social responsibility). Technology has greatly increased the public dis-
semination of information, undermining a company’s ability to hide socially ir-
responsible action, even if it occurs in a distant part of the world, and reinforcing 
“reputation [as] a valuable commodity.” Id. at 86. 
 181. Symeonides, supra note 97, at 223; cf. KIESTRA, supra note 88, at 24 
(observing that “[m]andatory rules do not—as of yet—play an important role in 
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B. LEGITIMACY 
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws does not require a le-
gitimacy standard for incorporating extrinsic material by refer-
ence.182 That makes sense: because incorporation by reference is 
“merely a shorthand way of drafting the contract,”183 any mate-
rial that could have been written directly into the contract 
should be able to be incorporated into the contract by refer-
ence.184 Therefore, soft law that could be directly written into a 
contract and made part of its terms should be able to be incorpo-
rated into that contract by reference.185 
Legitimacy nonetheless should require that the incorpo-
rated-by-reference soft law be clear and accessible.186 That would 
enable the soft law to be identified and found with clarity,187 and 
also would reduce the burden on courts.188  
 
the discussion concerning the impact of the [European Convention on Human 
Rights] on private international law”). 
 182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) cmt. c (de-
tailing parameters of incorporation by reference by declining to impose a legiti-
macy standard). 
 183. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 184. This can become complicated where the incorporation by reference is 
dynamic, automatically applying to the latest version of the incorporated mate-
rial. Normally, incorporation by reference is retrospective, applying only to a 
version of the incorporated material in existence at the time the contract is do-
ing the incorporation by reference. For a detailed discussion of the difference, 
see Daniel Schwarcz, Is U.S. Insurance Regulation Unconstitutional?, 25 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 191 (2018) (showing how states delegate substantial powers to the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a private body, by dy-
namically incorporating by reference NAIC materials). 
 185. This logic provides yet another reason why UCC § 1-302 should not be 
limited to incorporation by reference. See supra note 20. If that section were so 
limited, incorporation by reference under the UCC would be restricted to soft 
law promulgated by leading intergovernmental authorities or to trade codes 
such as the UCP. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 186. Because the choice-of-law analysis addressed this requirement in the 
context of discussing party autonomy, it was already taken as a given when 
discussing legitimacy. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. 
 187. See David Owens, Can Outside Material Be Incorporated by Reference 
into Local Development Regulations?, COATES’ CANONS: NC LOCAL GOV’T L. 
(May 5, 2014), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/can-outside-material-be 
-incorporated-by-reference-into-local-development-regulations/ [https://perma 
.cc/K83M-2L3A] (observing that “many courts have stated a general rule allow-
ing incorporation by reference if the document to be incorporated is sufficiently 
identified and made a part of the public record”). 
 188. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing how inaccessible 
or unclear use of soft law would increase courts’ burden, thereby undermining 
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C. PROPOSING AN INCORPORATION-BY-REFERENCE 
(ALTERNATIVE) FRAMEWORK  
Synthesizing the foregoing analysis, sophisticated parties to 
business contracts should have the right to incorporate soft-law 
rules into the contract by reference if (1) that incorporation by 
reference does not create significant externalities (or the social 
benefits of that incorporation by reference are likely to exceed 
those externalities); and (2) those rules are clear and accessi-
ble.189 Although any rules so incorporated would be overridden 
by applicable mandatory rules of local law, parties to business 
contracts rarely would want to disobey such mandatory rules.190 
It sometimes might be ambiguous whether a contract is pur-
porting to choose soft law as governing law or to incorporate that 
soft law by reference.191 Language stating that a contract is “gov-
erned by” or “subject to” particular soft law should evidence 
choosing that soft law as governing law.192 In the event of doubt, 
however, a court should make the final determination.193  
Next, this Article applies these frameworks to the Model 
Law, as an example of soft law.  
 
the policy goal of judicial efficiency). 
 189. Supra note 102 and accompanying text (asserting insignificant exter-
nalities should not preclude clear and accessible incorporation by reference); 
supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text (recognizing the need for accessibility 
to avoid harming judicial economy). 
 190. See Arthur Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus Re-
statement, 51 YALE L.J. 893, 908 (1942) (“There is some truth in the centuries-
old doctrine that parties contracting in a given territory must not disobey pro-
hibitions set up by the law of that territory.”). 
 191. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity of 
whether certain quoted language constitutes a choice of soft law or merely an 
incorporation of that soft law by reference). 
 192. HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, cmt. ¶ 4.3 (asserting that the use of 
the phrases “governed by” or “subject to” “meet the requirements of an express 
choice”). 
 193. See Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale 
of Financial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159, 164 (1996) (arguing that if there is doubt 
whether a given transfer of financial assets constitutes a sale or a secured loan, 
the court could make the final determination). In making that determination, 
the court might also consider giving second-best respect to the parties’ inten-
tions by re-characterizing a non-enforceable choice of soft law as an incorpora-
tion of that soft law by reference. See id. at 185–87 (arguing that if a court finds 
that a given transfer of financial assets would be unenforceable as a sale, it 
should re-characterize that transfer as (at least) a secured loan). 
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IV.  APPLYING THE CHOICE-OF-LAW AND 
INCORPORATION-BY-REFERENCE FRAMEWORKS 
Section A below applies the choice-of-law framework to the 
Model Law, as an example of soft law. Section B thereafter ap-
plies the incorporation-by-reference framework to the Model 
Law. These applications illustrate why choosing soft law as gov-
erning law and incorporating soft law by reference can provide 
flexible and practical alternatives to treaty-making. 
A. CHOOSING THE MODEL LAW AS GOVERNING LAW  
Under this Article’s framework, sophisticated parties to 
business contracts should have the right to choose soft law as 
governing law if (1) the choice of law does not create significant 
externalities (or the social benefits of that choice are likely to 
exceed those externalities); (2) the soft law is clear and accessi-
ble; and (3) the soft law has legitimacy by virtue of being either 
generally accepted, promulgated by a respected independent and 
unbiased organization, or manifestly fair. Using this framework, 
this Part considers whether parties to sovereign debt contracts 
should have the right to choose the Model Law as part of their 
governing law.194 
Parties to sovereign debt contracts are invariably sophisti-
cated, consisting of institutional creditors and debtor-states.195 
If those parties agree to choose the Model Law as part of their 
governing law,196 by definition they would bear no externali-
ties.197 Nor would there be externalities to subsequent holders of 
the sovereign debt, who derive their rights from the original debt 
contract and thus implicitly consent to its terms. Choosing the 
Model Law as part of the governing law also would be unlikely 
to impose externalities—much less, significant externalities—on 
 
 194. Most relevant to this analysis, the Model Law would allow a superma-
jority vote of creditors to change critical contract terms without necessarily get-
ting every affected party’s consent. SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, app., ch. III,  
art. 7(2).  
 195. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 196. To avoid law-change risk, any choice of law should lock in a specific 
version, by date, of the Model Law. 
 197. Parties who disagree with that choice in order to try to preserve their 
ability to act as rent-seeking holdouts could, technically, suffer externalities. 
However, the law should not protect the ability to unreasonably extract value 
from other parties in a debt restructuring. Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 374.  
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others.198 Other creditors of the debtor-state would be unaffected 
because the Model Law, by its terms, only affects the rights and 
obligations of creditors that contractually consent to it.199 Em-
pirical data on supermajority-voting collective action clauses 
(CACs) also indicate that the most important provision of the 
Model Law—its supermajority voting—would be unlikely to in-
crease, and may even lower, overall sovereign-debt borrowing 
costs.200  
If anything, choosing the Model Law as part of the governing 
law would produce benefits. Designed to help a debtor-state re-
structure its unsustainable debts,201 the Model Law would re-
duce the social costs of sovereign debt crises, the need for sover-
eign debt bailouts, and the risk of systemic contagion from a 
debtor-state’s default.202 Furthermore, the Model Law would 
help to solve the problem of inadvertent variation, identified by 
Professor Gelpern. She argues that because “international policy 
initiatives to prevent and manage financial crises rest on the as-
sumption that sovereign debt contracts follow a generally ac-
cepted standard,” those initiatives “would make no sense in the 
 
 198. In general, soft-law choice of law would be unlikely to create significant 
externalities in a business context, where transactions typically operate within 
well-developed norms and customs. Those norms and customs may even con-
tribute to developing mandatory rules of local law and private international law. 
Absent the granting of collateral, for example, soft law would probably contra-
vene those mandatory rules if it gave special payment priority to particular 
creditors because “[t]he equality of creditors norm is widely viewed as the single 
most important principle in American bankruptcy law.” David A. Skeel, Jr., The 
Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 700 (2018). 
 199. SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, app., ch. I, art. 1(1). (“This Law applies 
where, by contract or otherwise, (a) the law of [this jurisdiction] governs . . . the 
debtor-creditor relationship between a State and its creditors . . . .”). 
 200. See Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the 
Eurozone, 18 REV. FIN. 2045, 2045 (2014) (finding that the inclusion of super-
majority-voting CACs in sovereign debt contracts actually leads to a lower cost 
of capital); cf. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVA-
TION, FRAMEWORKS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1 (2014) (arguing 
that uncertainty due to the absence of an effective debt-resolution framework 
“increases the costs of borrowing” for sovereigns). 
 201. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also SCHWARCZ, supra 
note 14, app., pmbl. (“The Purpose of this Law is to provide effective mecha-
nisms for restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt so as to reduce (a) the so-
cial costs of sovereign debt crises, (b) systemic risk to the financial system, (c) 
creditor uncertainty, and (d) the need for sovereign debt bailouts, which are 
costly and create moral hazard.”). 
 202. Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 347–48.  
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absence of standardisation.”203 She finds, however, that “sover-
eign bond contracts are not nearly as standardised as market 
participants and policy makers seem to suggest.”204 This inad-
vertent variation “can make contracts internally inconsistent, 
vulnerable to opportunistic lawsuits and errors of judicial inter-
pretation. Variation could also make debt instruments less liq-
uid, especially during periods of market stress.”205  
To reduce variation, she advocates “a more centralised, mod-
ular approach to [sovereign debt] contracting, whereby a subset 
of widely-used non-financial terms would be produced by an au-
thoritative third party (a public, private, or public-private body) 
and incorporated by reference in individual transactions.”206 The 
ability to include the Model Law as governing law would help to 
facilitate that modular approach. 
The Model Law should also meet the standard of being clear 
and accessible. It has been clearly codified.207 It also has been 
fully vetted by many of the world’s leading experts in sovereign 
debt restructuring.208 And it is publicly available on the Internet, 
without charge.209  
The Model Law additionally should meet the legitimacy 
standard of being either generally accepted, promulgated by a 
respected independent and unbiased organization, or manifestly 
fair. It is promulgated by CIGI, a highly respected independent 
and unbiased think tank.210 Also, its key provisions, which focus 
on supermajority voting,211 reflect generally accepted aspira-
tional best practices for sovereign debt restructuring. They par-
allel, for example, the supermajority-voting CACs212 proposed by 
the International Capital Market Association (ICMA),213 which 
 
 203. Gelpern, supra note 83, at 23. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 14. 
 208. See id. at 5 n.2 (naming the members of the International Insolvency 
Institute (III) Working Group on Sovereign Insolvencies and the CIGI ILRP 
Working Group on Cross-Border and Sovereign Insolvencies who vetted the 
Model Law). 
 209. See generally id. (stating that materials are “[a]vailable as free down-
loads at www.cigionline.org”). 
 210. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 211. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 14, app., ch. III, art. 7 (“Voting on the Plan”); 
cf. supra note 194 (discussing supermajority voting). 
 212. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Collective Action Clauses, INT’L CAP. MKT. ASS’N, https://www 
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are already included in numerous sovereign debt contracts.214 
Their inclusion does not appear to raise, and may actually lower, 
a debtor-state’s funding costs.215 The treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Stability Mechanism, an intergovernmental financial in-
stitution “[committed to] ensuring the financial stability of the 
euro area,”216 even mandates that supermajority-voting CACs be 
included “in all new euro area [long-term] government  
securities.”217 
The Model Law thus fits well into this Article’s normative 
framework for choosing soft law as governing law.218 Parties to 
sovereign debt contracts therefore should have the right to 
choose the Model Law as part of their governing law.219 Reality, 
however, does not always follow scholarly norms. The legitimacy 
of choosing the Model Law as governing law and its political ac-




When included, such CACs would enable a specified supermajority, such as two-
thirds or three-quarters, of the contracting parties to amend the principal 
amount, interest rate, maturities, and other critical repayment terms. Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Ap-
proach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1003–04 (2000). 
 214. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Professor of Law, Georgetown & Senior Fellow, 
Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Presentation to PEIF Research Group Meeting: 
Sovereign Debt Contracts and Sovereign Debt Policy (Apr. 1, 2017), https:// 
piie.com/system/files/documents/gelpern20170401ppt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
RVZ3-RM9L] (observing based on IMF data that supermajority-voting CACs 
had been included in $1.032 trillion of sovereign bonds as of October 2016).  
 215. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 216. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, at 2, Feb. 2, 
2012, T/ESM 2012-LT/en. 
 217. Id. art. 12(3). 
 218. Although the above analysis does not demonstrate that the Model Law 
is manifestly fair, it does not need to because it satisfies at least one—if not 
two—of the other criteria for demonstrating legitimacy. Cf. Schwarcz, supra 
note 45, at 359–60 (discussing why the Model Law is not unfair to holdouts).  
 219. Because the Model Law focuses on sovereign debt restructuring, parties 
to sovereign debt contracts may well want to choose other law (e.g., the debtor-
state’s local law, or New York or English law) to apply absent a debt restructur-
ing. This Article’s framework would accommodate that. See supra note 30 and 
accompanying text.  
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port from sovereign debt stakeholders220 or from high-reputation 
international organizations like UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL.221  
B. INCORPORATING THE MODEL LAW BY REFERENCE 
Under this Article’s framework, sophisticated parties to 
business contracts should have the right to incorporate soft-law 
rules into the contract by reference if (1) that incorporation by 
reference does not create significant externalities (or the social 
benefits of that incorporation by reference are likely to exceed 
those externalities); and (2) those rules are clear and accessi-
ble.222 Parties to sovereign debt contracts invariably are sophis-
ticated.223 The Model Law is clear and accessible.224 The provi-
sions of the Model Law should not create significant 
externalities.225 There is little doubt, therefore, that those par-
ties should have the right to incorporate the Model Law by ref-
erence.226 Furthermore, because of its lower legitimacy  
 
 220. Pauwelyn et al., supra note 9, at 742 (observing that legitimacy “flows 
from [among] other sources . . . acceptance by affected stakeholders”); supra 
note 109 and accompanying text (discussing consultation with stakeholders as 
part of the process for obtaining trust, and hence legitimacy).  
 221. Cf. supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text (analyzing the extent to 
which such support would increase legitimacy and enforceability). Another way 
to increase the Model Law’s legitimacy would be to persuade nations to enact 
legislation explicitly authorizing the Model Law to be chosen as governing law. 
See supra note 127 and accompanying text (observing that another way for soft 
law to achieve legitimacy is for national law explicitly to authorize it).  
 222. See supra notes 186–89, 196–200 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.  
 224. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text. 
 226. One might ask whether incorporating the Model Law by reference could 
introduce such a degree of discretion as to create legitimacy concerns. For ex-
ample, the Model Law creates a voting process. Although that process is un-
likely to require significant discretion, its Supervisory Authority might have to 
exercise minimal discretion. That exercise of discretion should not, however, 
undermine legitimacy; legitimacy is created by the parties agreeing to abide by 
decisions of the Supervisory Authority in accordance with the Model Law. See 
Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discre-
tionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 
43 DUKE L.J. 703, 718 (1994) (analyzing how the exercise of discretion is legiti-
mized). In general, though, legitimacy is inversely proportional to discretion. Cf. 
Bryane Michael & Say-Hak Goo, Hard Corporate Governance Law in a Soft Law 
Jurisdiction (Univ. of H.K. Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 2018/007, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id=3101276 [https://perma 
.cc/M44M-MACR] (explaining why corporate governance rules can be enhanced 
by being concrete and specific).  
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requirements,227 incorporating the Model Law by reference 
should be easier to accomplish than choosing the Model Law as 
governing law. 
To the extent parties incorporate the Model Law by refer-
ence into new sovereign debt contracts, incorporation by refer-
ence should also be as effective as choice of law. Although soft-
law incorporation by reference would be subject to applicable 
mandatory rules of local law, choice of law would be limited by 
private international law, which respects overriding mandatory 
rules of local law.228 As discussed, there may be little difference 
between such mandatory rules and overriding mandatory 
rules.229 Also, at least for new sovereign debt contracts, nothing 
in the Model Law should contravene either category of manda-
tory rules. Furthermore, for reputational and other reasons, par-
ties to sovereign-debt and other business contracts may not want 
to disobey any such mandatory rules.230  
However, incorporating the Model Law by reference into ex-
isting sovereign debt contracts could be more difficult than 
choosing the Model Law as the governing law of those contracts. 
The Model Law’s supermajority voting would contravene con-
tracts that require unanimity to change key payment terms such 
as principal amount, interest rate, and maturities.231 Although 
it ultimately would be a matter of contract interpretation, 
amending that unanimity requirement by incorporating the 
Model Law by reference would likely itself require a unanimous 
vote of the contracting parties.232  
 
 227. Compare supra Parts II.C.1–4 (discussing the legitimacy requirements 
for choosing soft law as governing law), with supra notes 182–86 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the de minimis legitimacy requirements for incorporating 
soft law by reference). 
 228. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (distinguishing between man-
datory rules and overriding mandatory rules in private international law).  
 229. See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text (noting how this dis-
tinction is less important in practice). 
 230. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text (explaining the reputa-
tional reasons for following mandatory rules). 
 231. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (explaining the supermajor-
ity provisions promoted by the International Capital Market Association). 
 232. A related question would be whether the proposed amendment incorpo-
rating the Model Law by reference is specific enough to overcome the contrac-
tual language requiring unanimity for changing those terms. See Royce de R. 
Barondes, Side Letters, Incorporation by Reference and Construction of Contrac-
tual Relationships Memorialized in Multiple Writings, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 651, 
709 (2012) (“Another commonly applied principle of contract interpretation is 
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In contrast, the parties to an existing sovereign debt con-
tract technically should have the right to choose the Model Law 
as governing law by whatever requisite non-unanimous (e.g., 
majority) vote allows amendment of the governing law. Once 
chosen as governing law, the Model Law’s supermajority voting 
would, by its terms, supplant the unanimity requirement for 
changing the key payment terms.233 Besides raising an issue of 
first impression,234 the effectiveness of the Model Law’s super-
majority voting to supplant the unanimity requirement would be 
subject to any applicable overriding mandatory rule of local law, 
such as sanctity of contract.235 Any such mandatory rule that 
otherwise preserves unanimity, however, arguably should not 
protect rent-seeking holdouts, such as an investor that pur-
chases sovereign debt at a deep discount in order to demand pay-
ment in full lest it veto a debt restructuring.236  
Although this Article uses the Model Law to illustrate soft 
law’s application, it does not analyze the extent to which choos-
ing the Model Law as governing law or incorporating it by refer-
ence could solve the problem of unsustainable sovereign debt.237 
Nonetheless, that choice of law or incorporation by reference 
should at least help to solve that problem and the problem of 
 
that, where there is a conflict between a general provision and a specific provi-
sion, the latter controls.”). 
 233. See supra note 194 (discussing how the Model Law would allow super-
majorities to change contract terms).  
 234. That issue could be framed in the abstract as follows. Assume a busi-
ness contract requires a majority vote to amend its governing law but a unani-
mous vote to change certain payment terms. If the requisite majority votes to 
change the governing law to one that explicitly allows supermajority voting to 
change those payment terms, would that be effective to enable supermajority 
voting to change those payment terms? 
 235. Recall that private international law respects overriding mandatory 
rules of local law. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 374–76; see also supra note 197 (argu-
ing that limitations on externalities should not protect rent-seeking holdouts). 
Rent-seeking means seeking to increase one’s share of existing wealth without 
creating new wealth. See Christina Majaski, Rent Seeking, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 
28, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rentseeking.asp [https:// 
perma.cc/3NU7-K7DP]. 
 237. Professor John Pottow suggested at the Michigan Law Conference, for 
example, that attempts to incorporate by reference or to choose the Model Law 
might signal to creditors that the debtor-state implicitly contemplates a debt 
restructuring, motivating them to block the attempt. Michigan Law Conference, 
supra note 4. Professor Henry Gabriel also observed that such attempts might 
face the hurdle that the Model Law is new, potentially unfamiliar, and lacks a 
successful track record. Id.  
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inadvertent variation.238 It also should help to make the Model 
Law more generally accepted, which would increase its legiti-
macy and incrementally help to develop sovereign-debt-restruc-
turing norms.239 Even the UCP, the leading example of soft law 
having sufficient legitimacy to be chosen as governing law,240 
was originally promulgated in 1933 and took decades to become 
generally accepted.241 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Article analyzes an innovative use of soft law242: as the 
governing “law” of business contracts. The topic is timely and 
important because parties to financial and commercial transac-
tions increasingly look to soft law to guide their conduct, yet soft 
law’s lack of enforceability can undermine predictability. Allow-
ing parties to choose soft law as governing law would increase 
predictability by making the soft law enforceable against those 
parties.  
Starting with a handful of narrow precedents, the Article 
builds a normative framework for choosing soft law as governing 
law. As a foundation, the Article analyzes conflicts of law, party 
autonomy, and the fundamental underpinnings of choice of law. 
It then tempers that analysis by examining how the limits of 
freedom of contracting should restrain party autonomy. There-
after, it examines the legitimacy needed to persuade govern-
ments to enforce a soft-law choice of law. Based on that analysis, 
the Article argues that sophisticated parties should have the 
right to choose soft law to govern all or part of their business 
contracts if three conditions are met: (1) the choice of soft law 
does not create significant externalities (or its social benefits are 
 
 238. See supra notes 201–07 and accompanying text (noting arguments for 
the benefits of the Model Law as part of the governing law).  
 239. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (arguing that the adoption of 
soft law can provide an incremental and practical approach to developing 
norms, which governments may later codify into hard law); supra notes 106–08 
and accompanying text (explaining the importance of legitimacy in allowing en-
forcement). 
 240. See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text (noting the widespread 
acceptance of the UCP). 
 241. FRANS P. DE ROOY, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS 9–11 (1984). 
 242. Recall that soft law refers to a set of rules not yet enacted into law by 
any governmental body. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (recounting 
the general consensus among experts at the Michigan Law Conference); see also 
supra note 11 and accompanying text (observing that using soft law as govern-
ing law would be novel).  
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likely to exceed those externalities); (2) the soft law is clear and 
accessible; and (3) the soft law has sufficient legitimacy by virtue 
of being generally accepted, promulgated by a respected inde-
pendent and unbiased organization, or manifestly fair.  
The Article also compares the right to choose soft law as gov-
erning law with the right merely to incorporate that soft law by 
reference into business contracts. Sophisticated parties should 
have that lesser right even if the soft law lacks legitimacy, so 
long as the soft law’s rules could have been written directly into 
the contract and made part of its terms. 
Finally, the Article applies its analysis to a real-world ex-
ample of soft law: a sovereign-debt-restructuring model law pro-
posed by an independent and non-partisan international think 
tank. This helps to illustrate other differences between choice of 
law and incorporation by reference. For example, soft law that is 
incorporated by reference would be subject to all mandatory 
rules of local law, whereas soft law chosen as governing law 
would only be subject to “overriding” mandatory rules of local 
law. That difference, however, can be subtle; courts do not al-
ways clearly distinguish mandatory rules of local law and over-
riding mandatory rules.243  
  
 
 243. See, e.g., supra notes 86–93, 174–82 and accompanying text (explaining 
why courts may well interpret a mandatory local-law rule protecting infants as 
an overriding mandatory local-law rule and noting reputational reasons why 
private actors may adopt mandatory rules). 
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APPENDIX A—APPLYING THE FRAMEWORKS TO OTHER 
SOFT-LAW EXAMPLES 
This Appendix applies the Article’s choice-of-law and incor-
poration-by-reference frameworks244 to other soft-law examples. 
To avoid repetition, the examples assume (with one exception245) 
sophisticated parties to business contracts.  
A. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORKS TO THE INCOTERMS RULES 
The Incoterms Rules are a codification by the ICC246 of in-
ternationally accepted definitions and rules of interpretation for 
common commercial terms used in contracts for the sale of 
goods.247  
Parties should have the right to choose the Incoterms Rules 
as governing law if (1) that choice of law does not create signifi-
cant externalities (or the social benefits of that choice are likely 
to exceed those externalities); (2) the Incoterms Rules are clear 
and accessible; and (3) the Incoterms Rules have legitimacy by 
virtue of being either generally accepted, promulgated by a re-
spected independent and unbiased organization, or manifestly 
fair. That choice of law would be unlikely to create significant 
externalities because the Incoterms Rules represent internation-
ally accepted definitions and rules of interpretation. The Inco-
terms Rules are clear and accessible because they have been cod-
ified by the ICC and are available online (albeit for a relatively 
modest fee) from the ICC Store.248 The Incoterms Rules should 
have legitimacy because (among other reasons) the ICC is a 
highly respected neutral organization.249 Accordingly, parties 
 
 244. The choice-of-law framework is set forth supra notes 157–62 and accom-
panying text. The incorporation-by-reference framework is set forth in  
Part III.C. 
 245. See infra note 257 and accompanying text (describing soft law written 
by credit card associations). 
 246. Recall that the ICC is the International Chamber of Commerce, a pri-
vate-sector organization. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (intro-
ducing the ICC). 
 247. See Incoterms Rules, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://iccwbo.org/ 
resources-for-business/incoterms-rules/ [https://perma.cc/QX4Q-SBEQ]. 
 248. See Incoterms 2020, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://2go.iccwbo 
.org/incoterms-2020-eng-config+book_version-Book/ [https://perma.cc/QX4Q 
-SBEQ] (stating the fee as 40.00 euros for the e-book version and 45.00 euros 
for the print edition). 
 249. See supra notes 119, 136, 140–42 and accompanying text (explaining 
the ICC’s global reputation).  
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should have the right to choose the Incoterms Rules as governing 
law. 
Parties should have the right to incorporate the Incoterms 
Rules by reference if (1) that incorporation by reference does not 
create significant externalities (or the social benefits of that in-
corporation by reference are likely to exceed those externalities); 
and (2) those Rules are clear and accessible. The prior paragraph 
already has established that the Incoterms Rules should satisfy 
those conditions. Accordingly, parties should have the right to 
incorporate those Rules by reference. 
B. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORKS TO THE TRANSLEX-PRINCIPLES 
The TransLex-Principles are a Web-based synthesis of prin-
ciples and rules of transnational commercial law, collected and 
organized in the form of “black-letter law” by the Center for 
Transnational Law (CENTRAL) at the University of Cologne 
School of Law, Germany.250  
Parties should have the right to choose the TransLex-Prin-
ciples as governing law if (1) that choice of law does not create 
significant externalities (or the social benefits of that choice are 
likely to exceed those externalities); (2) the TransLex-Principles 
are clear and accessible; and (3) the TransLex-Principles have 
legitimacy by virtue of being either generally accepted, promul-
gated by a respected independent and unbiased organization, or 
manifestly fair. That choice of law would be unlikely to create 
significant externalities because the TransLex-Principles are 
based on lex mercatoria,251 a system of principles and rules of 
behavior that has evolved consensually among merchants.252 
The TransLex-Principles are clear and accessible because they 
are available online, for free, and are codified as black-letter 
 
 250. See Translex-Principles, TRANS-LEX, https://www.trans-lex.org/ 
principles/of-transnational-law-(lex-mercatoria) [https://perma.cc/TW3G 
-HSQF]. Professor Dr. Klaus Peter Berger is one of the principal scholars behind 
CENTRAL. See Prof. Dr. Klaus Peter Berger, L.L.M., DEUTSCHE INST. FÜR 
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT, http://www.disarb.org/en/0/mitglieder/ 
selbstdarstellung/klaus-peter-berger-id51 [https://perma.cc/HZP8-UNGA]. 
 251. See Klaus Peter Berger, The Lex Mercatoria (Old and New) and the 
Translex-Principles, TRANS-LEX, https://www.trans-lex.org/the-lex-mercatoria 
-and-the-translex-principles_ID8 [https://perma.cc/8W2S-GAC3]. 
 252. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2017). The UCP itself is an ICC codification of the lex mercatoria of interna-
tional letters of credit. See Corne, supra note 117, at 55 (recognizing the UCP as 
a manifestation of lex mercatoria, codifying customs, and practices of banks). 
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law.253 The TransLex-Principles also should have legitimacy be-
cause they are promulgated by the University of Cologne School 
of Law, a respected and neutral academic institution. Accord-
ingly, parties should have the right to choose the TransLex-Prin-
ciples as governing law.  
The prior paragraph has already established that the Trans-
Lex-Principles should satisfy the conditions for incorporation by 
reference. Accordingly, parties should have the right to incorpo-
rate those Principles by reference. 
C. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORKS TO PROBLEMATIC EXAMPLES OF 
SOFT LAW 
Soft-law rules tend to be aspirational or to reflect best prac-
tices,254 but even “best practices” can be problematic.255 To show 
the limits of the Article’s frameworks, consider the following 
problematic examples of soft law. For each example, parties 
should have the right to choose that soft law as governing law if 
the framework’s three conditions are met: (1) that choice of law 
does not create significant externalities (or the social benefits of 
that choice are likely to exceed those externalities); (2) the soft 
law is clear and accessible; and (3) the soft law has legitimacy by 
virtue of being either generally accepted, promulgated by a re-
spected independent and unbiased organization, or manifestly 
fair. They also should have the right to incorporate that soft law 
by reference if conditions (1) and (2) are met, without the need 
to satisfy condition (3).  
In the first problematic example, assume condition (1) is not 
met because choosing the proposed soft law would create signif-
icant externalities (and the social benefits of that choice would 
not be likely to exceed those externalities). This assumption 
would be atypical for a choice of soft law in business contracts.256 
It might occur, however, if the soft law is prepared by a large 
 
 253. See supra note 250. 
 254. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (reflecting on the consensus 
opinion of soft law experts at the Michigan Law Conference). 
 255. See, e.g., Patricia Katopol, Maybe Best Practices Aren’t: How Survivor-
ship Bias Skews Information Gathering and Decision-Making, 32 LIBR. LEAD-
ERSHIP & MGMT., Nov. 2017, at 1 (discussing how best practices can be biased). 
 256. See supra note 198 (developing this explanation more fully); see also 
supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text (explaining why soft law choice of 
law would be unlikely to create significant externalities). 
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trade association dealing with consumers.257 In that case, re-
gardless of the other conditions, the parties should not have the 
right to choose that soft law as governing law. Nor should they 
have the right to incorporate that soft law by reference.  
In the second problematic example, assume condition (2) is 
not met because the proposed soft law is not clear and accessible. 
This might occur, for example, if that soft law is not clearly cod-
ified or not publicly available. In that case, regardless of the 
other conditions, the parties should not have the right to choose 
that soft law as governing law. Nor should they have the right to 
incorporate that soft law by reference.  
In the third problematic example, assume condition (3) is 
not met because the proposed soft law lacks legitimacy. This 
might occur, for example, if that soft law is neither generally ac-
cepted, promulgated by a respected independent and unbiased 
organization, or manifestly fair. In that case, regardless of the 
other conditions, the parties should not have the right to choose 
that soft law as governing law. Nonetheless, they should have 
the right to incorporate that soft law by reference into their busi-
ness contract if conditions (1) and (2) are met. Incorporation by 
reference does not require the legitimacy condition required for 
choice of law.  
 
 
 257. E.g., Symeonides, supra note 167, at 126 (discussing soft-law rules 
drafted by credit-card associations and applicable to credit-card holders who 
had no participation or input in the drafting of those norms and observing that 
it “is not unreasonable to assume that in drafting these norms, the ‘association’ 
was not overly solicitous of the interests of [the] credit card holders”). The above 
example is the one exception to this Appendix’s assumption of sophisticated par-
ties to business contracts. See supra text accompanying note 245. 
